### SMS: The Mindset

How corporate culture can affect SMS implementation and be effected by it

Jason Starke
Universal Weather and Aviation, Inc.



### Agenda

- SMS: What it is, what it isn't, and the additional element
- What is safety culture?
- How can safety culture impact SMS implementation?
- How can SMS implementation impact safety culture?



### What an SMS is not...

- It is <u>not</u> a product that can be bought or a series of boxes to check
- It is <u>not</u> a guarantee of sufficient safety performance\*
- It is <u>not</u> something that can be bolted on to organizational processes
- It is <u>not</u> sufficient if practiced mechanically\*





### What an SMS is...

- An SMS is a collection or "toolbox"
- A set of beliefs and practices (culture)\*
- "...it [SMS] is held together by a fourth component – safety culture."\*





### What is SMS?

### First and foremost, it is a system to manage safety

- Composed of four sub-systems that interact with each other to achieve the goal of the system
- What is the goal of the system?
  - Identify hazards, reduce risk and assure an optimal level of safety performance
- What are the four sub-systems?
  - **1. Safety policy**: foundation of the SMS
  - 2. Safety risk management: proactively seek out hazards, assess and mitigate risk
  - **3. Safety assurance**: monitor operations and collect data to assure safety performance, identify emerging hazards and gauge SMS performance
  - **4. Safety promotion**: dissemination of safety information, SMS performance data, and commitment to training



### Goal of an SMS

- The processes of an SMS (toolbox items) should work together
- The goal of a system approach to safety is to further reduce the incident rate by making safety 'behavior driven.'\*
- If everyone is trained to do their jobs in a safe manner and proactively look for hazards, then a company can improve their defenses and build an organization more resistant to human error.\*



### Culture and SMS

- A developed systems approach to managing safety can help improve culture, assuming the worst-casescenario of a pathological organization is not in place
- An "ideal" or "appropriate" culture must be in place to implement SMS



### This remains a hot topic of debate

- Safety culture as a term was not created by the aviation industry
- "Safety culture" was first used in a 1986 IAEA report on the Chernobyl disaster\*





- Continental Express accident near Eagle Lake, Texas in 1991:
  - "The failure of Continental Express management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures..."\*
  - "The NTSB has on a number of occasions identified a weak safety culture as being a factor in accidents in several transportation modes."\*
- So what is it?




"There is no such thing as 'safety culture' in and of itself, but rather organizational culture and how this culture affects and/or influences safety, positively or negatively."\*



### Organizational culture

Each organization will have its own distinct cultural environment







Organizational culture: A definition

"Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with an organization's structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms."\*

- In layman terms: The way we do things 'round here
- Research has shown that even in one organization different functional units can have subcultures.\*



### Organizational culture as it relates to safety

- "Safety culture may be taken as the enduring value and priority placed on workers and public safety by every group at every level of the organization."\* or...
- "Organizations with positive safety culture are characterized by communication founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measure."\*



 Is there a way to give attributes or defined components (ingredients) to something so nebulous to aid in making it more tangible?


Yes. Four components of safety culture\*:

- Reporting culture people share within the system
- 2. Just culture people are held accountable to the system
- 3. Flexible culture people adapt to the system
- 4. Learning culture people improve the system

Informed culture



Is there a benchmark or yard stick to measure your safety culture against?
 Levels of safety culture maturity





### Attributes of each level of maturity\*

- Pathological: the sick culture
- Reactive: the "knee-jerk" culture
- Calculative: the mechanically acting culture
- Proactive: seeking culture
- Generative: safety is intrinsic



Measuring through climate





#### Measuring through climate


#### What is safety climate?

- "...the surface features of the safety culture discerned from the workforce's attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time"\*
- "...a snapshot of the state of safety, providing an indicator of the underlying safety culture..."\*

### Why is it important?

- Perceived
- Dynamic
- Weather





With acknowledgement to Dr. Robert Baron, The Aviation Consulting Group



### Measuring through climate





SMS can fail on a poor and unknown foundation poor and unknown foundation





#### Initial assessment - Internal

- Self-survey: TP 13844\*
  - http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/publications/tp13844-menu-275.htm
- Participant Survey:
  - Guidance for development found in "Safety Culture Framework for the ECAST SMS-WG"\*



#### Initial assessment - Internal

- General Self Observation\*
  - Red Flags
    - Apathy
    - Lack of trust
    - Sacrifices made to save money/time
    - Reactive tendencies
  - Overheard comments:
    - Nobody ever listens to me
    - Nobody really cares
    - I hope...
    - This is the way we do things around here



Initial assessment - Internal

Were there any red flags at NASA?



Garcia & Boyer, n.d.



#### Initial assessment - External

- Value in using a third-party provider/consultant
  - Measuring safety climate
  - Acclimation



Pitfalls with the different levels of maturity using Reason's four culture components

	Pathogenic	Reactive	Calculative
Reporting	<ul><li>Messengers shot</li><li>No communication</li></ul>		
Just	<ul><li> Little trust</li><li> No tolerance</li></ul>		
Flexible	• Lack of autonomy		
Learning	<ul><li> Indecisions</li><li> Data not shared</li></ul>		
Other pitfalls	<ul><li>Lack of accountability</li><li>No inter-department communication</li><li>No buy-in</li></ul>		Weather & Assisting for

 Tips for SMS implementation in a <u>pathogenic</u> culture that might need attention

Intervention!



## Pitfalls with the different levels of maturity using Reason's four culture components

	Pathogenic	Reactive	Calculative
Reporting	<ul><li>Messengers shot</li><li>No communication</li></ul>	<ul><li>Denial</li><li>Low levels of trust</li></ul>	
Just	<ul><li>Little trust</li><li>No tolerance</li></ul>	• Responsibility for failures	
Flexible	Lack of autonomy	Workforce not trusted	
Learning	<ul><li>Indecisions</li><li>Data not shared</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Data stagnation</li> <li>Information flow in one direction only</li> <li>Lessons learned <i>after</i> the fact</li> </ul>	
Other pitfalls	<ul><li>Lack of accountability</li><li>No inter-department communication</li><li>No buy-in</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Knee-jerk procedures</li> <li>Questionable legal requirements</li> <li>Poor safety conditions</li> </ul>	

Tips for SMS implementation in a reactive culture that might need attention

Four components of a SMS			
Safety Policy	Safety Risk Management	Safety Assurance	<b>Safety Promotion</b>
<ul> <li>Non-punitive policy</li> <li>Management accountability</li> <li>Advertise safety commitment</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Proactive risk management</li> <li>Standards above legal requirements</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Enhanced data analysis</li> <li>Manager awareness</li> <li>Promote reporting</li> <li>Inclusion of employees in fixes</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Bi-lateral data flow</li><li>Publicize successes</li><li>Training</li></ul>



## Pitfalls with the different levels of maturity using Reason's four culture components

	Pathogenic	Reactive	Calculative
Reporting	<ul><li>Messengers shot</li><li>No communication</li></ul>	<ul><li>Denial</li><li>Low levels of trust</li></ul>	Information ignored
Just	<ul><li> Little trust</li><li> No tolerance</li></ul>	• Responsibility for failures	Selective blaming
Flexible	• Lack of autonomy	Workforce not trusted	Frontline employees not empowered
Learning	<ul><li>Indecisions</li><li>Data not shared</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Data stagnation</li> <li>Information flow in one direction only</li> <li>Lessons learned <i>after</i> the fact</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>No follow-up</li> <li>"It's all good" (wink)</li> <li>Lack of top-down feedback</li> <li>Hindered bottom-up</li> </ul>
Other pitfalls	<ul> <li>Lack of accountability</li> <li>No inter-department communication</li> <li>No buy-in</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Knee-jerk procedures</li> <li>Questionable legal requirements</li> <li>Poor safety conditions</li> </ul>	<ul><li> "Bookshelf" procedures</li><li> Complacency</li><li> False appearance</li></ul>

Tips for SMS implementation in a <u>calculative</u> culture that might need attention

Four components of a SMS			
Safety Policy	Safety Risk Management	Safety Assurance	<b>Safety Promotion</b>
<ul><li>Accountabilities defined</li><li>Performance goals</li></ul>	• Communicating hazards	<ul> <li>Track performance indicators</li> <li>Follow-up</li> <li>Promote reporting</li> <li>Inclusion of employees in fixes</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Informing accountable executive</li> <li>Publicize successes</li> <li>Relevant safety meetings</li> </ul>



#### Beyond calculative

- Life after calculative\*
  - Mechanical performance
- SMS now becomes intrinsic to further culture maturity
- Safety management programs that can help take your culture to the next level:
  - Culture assessments
  - FOQA, LOSA
  - ASAP-type programs
  - Wider scope data sampling
  - Forecasting



### Beyond calculative





Figure 1: The safety performance will improve as the culture matures, but there can only start to be talk of a Safety Culture once the calculative stage has been passed


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Hudson, n.d.



#### YES!



Hudson, n.d.



- Hope!
- "...a safety culture can only arise when the necessary technical steps and procedures are already in place and in operation.\*
- "By constructing deliberate procedure, an organization can force itself into taking safety seriously"\*



#### Process impact through Reason's four components

#### 1. Reporting culture

- Implement a simple reporting process
- Establish lines of communication

#### Just culture

- Non-punitive action
- Immunity
- Policies and processes

#### 3. Flexible culture

- Employee training in hazard identification and risk management
- Empowering managers
- Robust operating procedures

#### 4. Learning culture

- Safety assurance processes
- Lessons learned
- Management accountabilities
- Action groups
- Processes



#### The bottom line

- Deliberate, systematic processes can drive safety culture to a point
- Beyond that point, safety management becomes less extrinsic and more intrinsic
- Difficult news: Change is hard
- Good news: It can be and has been done
  - Research shows that smaller organizations, like corporate flight departments, are more likely able to develop toward the generative culture\*
  - Smaller organizations are more flexible and focused\*



#### Final quote

"...an effective culture of safety is one that has
practiced safety management until that skill set has
become second nature – safety is simply the way
business is done, and improvements to the system are
considered improvements to the company as a
whole." \*



#### Conclusion

- SMS is not a "product" but rather a system composed of people, processes, resources and culture
- Safety culture is viewed as organizational culture's attitude towards safety and is manifest through the safety climate
- Safety culture has four components: reporting, just, flexible and learning\*
- Safety culture has five levels of maturity: pathogenic, reactive, calculative, proactive and generative\*



### Conclusion

- Safety climate should be measured prior to and during SMS implementation to get a "lay of the land" and a sense of maturity
- Safety culture weaknesses can affect SMS implementation
- SMS implementation can impact safety culture up to a point
- Beyond the calculative level of maturity, SMS becomes less about implemented processes and becomes more intrinsic



### Any questions?





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### About the presenter

#### Jason Starke

- A former corporate pilot and United States Air Force veteran, Captain Jason Starke is an expert on aviation safety and operations. He currently serves as Safety Management and Integration (SM&I) Operations Manager for Universal Weather and Aviation, Inc.
- Jason has more than 21 total years of aviation experience and led his previous company's SMS and Emergency Response Plan implementation. As a pilot, he maintains currency with the Hawker and Challenger 600 aircraft and assists with simulator instruction on those aircraft. He has also flown the King Air 90, CE-421, Citation I, Citation II, V, VII, Hawker 800, and Challenger 601. He has also served as a presenter on SMS at industry events and holds a Bachelor's of Science in Meteorology and a Master's Degree in Aviation with specializations in safety and operations.
- Jason can be reached at <u>jasonstarke@univ-wea.com</u>.

